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In 1-976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA),I which essentially codified the theory of restrictive sovereign im-
munity.2 Congress intended the Act to transfer from the executive
branch to the judicial branch the decision whether to grant jurisdictional
immunity to a sovereign defendant brought before American courts.
3
The legislative history and subsequent case law indicate that the limited
exceptions to immunity enumerated in the FSIA are the sole grounds for
subjecting a foreign sovereign to the jurisdiction of American courts.
4
Courts have not agreed, however, on the effect of the FSIA on the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA),5 which is a jurisdictional grant included in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The ATCA provides that aliens may bring suit in
federal district courts for alleged torts which are violations of interna-
tional law. The recent case of Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic6 marked the first departure by a circuit court of appeals from
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976)). The Act begins with a presumption of immunity
that can be overcome if the actions of the sovereign defendant fit into one of the exceptions
described by the Act. See id § 1604.
2. Restrictive sovereign immunity denies immunity to sovereigns for their commercial
activities-Le., activities where the sovereign enters the market as a private party-but grants
immunity for all public actions by sovereigns. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461
U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976);
West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1987). See infra note 11 and
accompanying text.
3. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the issue of sovereign immunity was determined
largely by the executive branch through letters to courts from the State Department. The
decision became political in nature, with the State Department often being subjected to diplo-
matic pressure from foreign sovereigns seeking immunity. With codification of the standards
by which immunity is to be determined, the decision became exclusively that of the courts. See
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-87; Multibanco Comermex, 807 F.2d at 824; Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421
(2d Cir. 1987), cerL granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
4. See infra notes 13-21, 114-126 and accompanying text.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
6. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
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the conventional view that, despite the jurisdictional grant of the ATCA,
any suit against a sovereign must first pass the jurisdictional require-
ments of the FSIA.
7
This Note examines the relationship between the ATCA and the
FSIA, and proposes an amendment to the FSIA which would grant fed-
eral courts authority to assert jurisdiction over cases alleging violations
of international law. Section I of the Note describes the current statutory
scheme for deciding questions of sovereign immunity, as embodied in the
FSIA. Section II examines the relationship between the FSIA and the
ATCA. First, Section II describes the ATCA and its use in recent cases
as a basis for jurisdiction, and as a means of circumventing the FSIA.
Section II then analyzes the reasoning of the district court and the court
of appeals in Amerada Hess. This analysis concludes that the Second
Circuit erred in asserting jurisdiction over the case under the current
statutory structure.
Section III of this Note argues that Congress should empower the
federal judiciary to hear cases, like Amerada Hess, that involve violations
of international law committed by a sovereign outside of its own terri-
tory. Section III first explains the public policy reasons for hearing such
cases and then proposes an amendment to the FSIA that would allow
such cases to be heard. Finally, this section addresses possible objections
to and ramifications of such an amendment.
I. The FSIA: The Modern Statutory Scheme
The grant of sovereign immunity in American law is at least as old
as The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.8 In granting sovereign immu-
nity to France in a suit for possession of a schooner, this 1812 case held
that sovereign immunity was not based on a rule of law, but on notions of
grace and comity between nations. 9 The Schooner Exchange confirmed
the existence of absolute sovereign immunity in the United States and
held that since sovereign immunity was not a right compelled by law, the
decision whether to grant immunity was usually a political one made by
the executive branch acting through the State Department.10 In the Tate
7. See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
8. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). An earlier case, Nathan v. Virginia, I U.S. (1 Dali.) 77
(1781), in which Pennsylvania's courts granted immunity to the state of Virginia, is sometimes
cited as the true origin of sovereign immunity in American courts. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 435 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores,
688 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1982); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638
F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1466 (1988).
9. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
10. The Supreme Court in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983), stated:
As The Schooner Exchange made clear, however, foreign sovereign immunity is a
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Letter of 1952,11 the State Department announced their adoption of the
"restrictive" sovereign immunity theory. Under this theory, a foreign
sovereign is immune only from suits regarding their public acts, not their
purely commercial acts. Despite this limitation in discretion, the deci-
sion whether to grant immunity to a sovereign was still made by the State
Department and often subject to diplomatic pressure from sovereigns
seeking immunity.
12
In 1976, Congress responded to the problems caused by State De-
partment determination of grants of sovereign immunity by enacting the
FSIA. The legislative history of the Act indicates that its major purposes
were to codify the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity; to em-
power the judicial branch, rather than the executive branch, with the
determination of immunity; and to detail procedures for making service
upon and obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 13 Ac-
cording to its drafters, the FSIA
sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving ques-
tions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states in Federal and
State courts in the United States. It is intended to preempt any other
State or Federal law (excluding applicable international agreements)
for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivi-
sions, their agencies, and their instrumentalities. 14
Section 1602 of the FSIA states the purpose of the Act in similar
language, but also emphasizes that "[c]laims of foreign states to immu-
nity should henceforth be decided ... in conformity with the principles
set forth in this chapter."1 5 Section 1604 states the presumption of im-
munity: "Subject to existing international agreements of which the
United States is a party ... a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 and 1607 of this chapter."16
The legislative history of the Act provides that a foreign state must
specifically plead sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense; in court,
matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction
imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly, this Court consistently has deferred to
the decisions of the political branches-in particular those of the Executive Branch-
on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their
instrumentalities.
See supra note 3.
11. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Acting At-
torney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984-85
(1952); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
12. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 24.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976) [hereinafter HousE REPORT],
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6604, 6605-06.
14. Id at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6610.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
16. Id § 1604.
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it bears the burdens of producing evidence in support of immunity and of
proving that it fits within the immunity statute. 17 At least one court,
however, has interpreted section 1604 to remove this burden of pleading
and proving immunity from the foreign state, reasoning that the pre-
sumption of immunity for foreign states requires the issue to be resolved
as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.18 This would be true even
if the foreign state failed to make an appearance to specifically plead
immunity.
Section 1605 contains the following major exceptions to immunity:
(1) explicit or implied waiver; (2) actions based on commercial activity;
(3) property taken through expropriations in violation of international
law; (4) rights in property in the United States acquired by gift or suc-
cession; and (5) damages for certain torts occurring in the United
States. 19 Section 1607 provides an additional exception for counter-
claims against a foreign sovereign plaintiff.
20
Almost without exceptio;., courts have concluded that the immunity
of a foreign sovereign is determined solely by the FSIA, and that immu-
nity is denied only when one of the Act's exceptions has been met.21 This
conclusion seems inescapable considering the language of the legislative
history and of the Act itself.
II. The ATCA in the Modern Statutory Scheme
A. The ATCA
The Alien Tort Claims Act, in its original form, was part of the
17. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6616.
18. Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1985). The Frolova court stated:
Thus, the statement in the legislative history that sovereign immunity is an affirma-
tive defense which must be pleaded and proven by the party asserting it ... is not
entirely accurate. Because the absence of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to
subject matter jurisdiction, the question of immunity must be considered by a district
court even though the foreign country whose immunity is at issue has not entered an
appearance.
Id. at 373.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
20. Id. § 1607.
21. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983); Frolova,
761 F.2d at 372; O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 116-18 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1086 (1984); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
Nos. 83-2794, 83-3007, 83-3678, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1985); Siderman v. Republic of
Argen., No. CV 82-1772-RMT(MCx) (Order Vacating Default Judgment and Dismissing Ac-
tion) slip op. at 3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985). But see Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246,
250-59 (D.D.C. 1985) (jurisdiction over cases alleging clear violations of international law is
proper under the ATCA and is not affected by the FSIA).
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Judiciary Act of 1789.22 In its current form, section 1350 of the ATCA
provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."' 23 The rationale for this grant of
jurisdiction remains a mystery. It has been termed a "legal Lohengrin"
since no one seems to know its theoretical base.24
Modem courts have explained that it exists to provide consistency
in dealings with foreign nations and to provide a forum for actions of
international significance. 25 The ATCA has been invoked successfully
only three times. After it was used in Bolchos v. Darrel,26 a 1795 mari-
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).
23. Id The phrase "law of nations" is interchangeable with the more commonly used
"international law," or more specifically, "customary international law." A major issue in
complaints alleging a violation of international law is determining what, exactly, the custom-
ary international law is in a specific area. "[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators ...
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
24. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (1975). Lohengrin, a character from an
opera by Wagner, was a mysterious knight who appeared suddenly to champion the cause of a
fair maiden, and then disappeared as suddenly when his identity became known. See Note, A
Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L.
REv. 105, 105 n.3 (1979).
One commentator has described the original rationale for the ATCA as an attempt at
consistency in all legal dealings with aliens:
The statute reflects a congressional desire to make all claims involving aliens origi-
nally cognizable in federal courts.... Since one state's civil judgment against an
alien could be construed by a foreign sovereign as a national ratification, Congress
wished to provide a federal forum for alien complaints. The ATCA was enacted to
provide this forum.
Id. at 115.
Other commentators have seen the overriding purpose of the Act as one to permit "the
use of federal courts by individuals to enforce rights arising under international law." Note,
The Law of Nations in the District Courts Federal Jurisdiction over Tort Claims by Aliens
Under 28 US.C. § 1350, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 71, 76 (1977).
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985), Judge Bork searched for some history or rationale behind the statute,
and concluded:
I have discovered no direct evidence of What Congress had in mind when enacting
the provision. The debates over the Judiciary Act in the House-the Senate debates
were not recorded-nowhere mention the provision, not even, so far as we are aware,
indirectly .... Historical research has not as yet discovered what section 1350 was
intended to accomplish.
25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
26. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). Bolchos involved the interpretation of a
treaty between the United States and France to determine the status of slaves aboard a Spanish
ship which had been captured as a prize of war. After first stating that it was "doubtful
whether this court had jurisdiction," the district judge decided that since "the 9th section of
the judiciary act of Congress [sic]" gave the court jurisdiction "where an alien sues for a tort,
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time case, the Act lay dormant until 1961, when it was invoked in Abdul-
Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift,27 a case involving a passport violation.
The latest and most celebrated successful use of section 1350 as the
basis for jurisdiction was in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.2 8 In Filartiga, a
Paraguayan physician filed suit for the wrongful death of his son. A
Paraguayan police officer killed and tortured the son allegedly because of
the physician's political beliefs. The central issue was whether torture
under color of government authority violated the law of nations. 29 The
district court, however, dismissed the case, even though it recognized the
strength of the plaintiff's argument that official torture does indeed vio-
late international law.30 The ruling was based on dicta from a previous
case which held that a state's treatment of its own citizens was outside
the realm of customary international law.31
The Second Circuit reversed finding that jurisdiction was conferred
by Congress under the ATCA. In an opinion by Judge Kaufman, the
court stated: "Having examined the sources from which customary in-
ternational law is derived ... we conclude that official torture is now
prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambigu-
ous and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens."'3
2
The Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga lifted the little-used
ATCA from obscurity and thrust it into the limelight. Commentators
immediately recognized that section 1350 could be used in human rights
in violation of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States," jurisdiction was proper.
The judge concluded: "I dismiss all doubt on the point." Id. at 810.
27. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). Clift was an action by a Lebanese plaintiff seeking
to recover custody of his daughter from her Iraqi mother. Id. at 859. The mother, by conceal-
ing the daughter's name and Lebanese citizenship, had gotten her admitted into the United
States under the mother's Iraqi passport. Id. at 860-62.
The court found that, because a passport was "rather in the character of a political docu-
ment," and the wrong was committed against both the United States and the Lebanese Repub-
lic, "the wrongful acts [were] therefore committed in violation of the law of nations." Id. at
864-65. Since the violations caused "direct and special injury to the plaintiff, he may bring an
action in tort" under section 1350. Id. at 865-66.
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 880.
30. See id.
31. Id. (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976)).
32. Id. at 884. A second possible hurdle in adjudication of Filartiga was the act of state
doctrine, a discretionary doctrine which precludes American courts from passing upon the
legality or validity of an act committed by a foreign government within its own territory. See
infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text. The argument that Officer Pena's actions were an
act of state and therefore not subject to adjudication was dismissed by the Second Circuit:
"[W]e doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
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litigation.
33
Several cases decided in the wake of Filartiga attempted to deter-
mine the proper scope of the newly rejuvenated section 1350. Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic34 limited the realm of possibilities created for the
ATCA by Filartiga. The suit arose out of a terrorist attack allegedly
perpetrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization on an Israeli tour
bus. The plaintiffs attempted to assert jurisdiction under section 1350,
but the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case
because the plaintiffs failed to show a "specific right to a private claim"
under international law.35 In addition, Libya was immune from the ac-
tion under the FSIA.36 The court never addressed the issue of whether
terrorism was a violation of the law of nations and paid scant attention to
Filartiga's holding that a private cause of action arises upon a showing
of a violation of the law of nations.
37
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision in a briefper curiam opinion, with each of the three
judges writing a long concurring opinion.38 Judge Edwards agreed with
the holding in Filartiga, but found that an action by "non-state actors"
does not constitute a violation of the law of nations essential for section
1350 jurisdiction.39 Judge Robb classified the issue of international ter-
rorism as a political question, and as such, nonjusticiable.40 Judge Bork
asserted that a plaintiff must show a specific private right of action to
bring suit under section 1350. He found no cause of action provided
under either international law or treaty, and refused to infer a cause of
action because of separation of power concerns, specifically those embod-
ied in the political question and act of state doctrines.41 Also, like the
district court, Judge Bork would dismiss Libya from the case because of
33. See, eg., Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53
(1981); Comment, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations: Interpreting the Alien Tort
Statute, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 413 (1981); Comment, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789: Polit-
ical Torture Provides Federal Jurisdiction Under the Statute, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213
(1981); Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: Implications of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 15 GA. L.
REv. 504 (1981).
34. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
35. Id at 549-50.
36. Id at 549 n.3.
37. Id. at 549.
38. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985).
39. Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
40. Id at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
41. Id at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
In examining the ATCA Judge Bork, in disagreement with the broad interpretation given
by the Second Circuit in Filartiga, asserted that section 1350 should not be interpreted as
"incorporating all the modem rules of international law and giving aliens private causes of
July 1988]
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sovereign immunity under the FSIA.42
Since the Second Circuit's ruling in Filartiga, a few cases have at-
tempted to use the ATCA to evade the FSIA's mandate of immunity,
subject to specific exceptions, in suits against sovereigns. The issue
whether the ATCA provides jurisdiction where the FSIA does not is an-
other attempt to define the scope of the "newly rejuvenated" ATCA so
that it will be in harmony with the modem statutory structure of the
FSIA. This issue has been considered by several district courts.
In Siderman v. Republic of Argentina,43 the District Court for the
Central District of California looked to the original intent of the ATCA
and concluded that it was not intended as an exception to the recognized
rule of sovereign immunity. This case, decided in 1985, was an action
against Argentina and one of its provinces for torture and the taking of
property by a former military regime. After asserting jurisdiction, the
court moved sua sponte to reconsider the issue of jurisdiction. It then
dismissed the case, finding that neither the FSIA nor the ATCA pro-
vided an exception to the defendants' sovereign immunity.
In addressing the argument that section 1350 created an exception
to foreign sovereign immunity, the court rejected the notion that the stat-
ute's silence as to the ATCA's intended effect on sovereign immunity was
tantamount to an implied exception to foreign sovereign immunity. In-
stead, the court determined that it must examine "the state of the immu-
nity law at the time of enactment." 44 The court then briefly reviewed the
legal history of foreign sovereign immunity and, based primarily on The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,45 found that the general rule at the
action for violation of those rules." Id. at 812. This assertion was based on "the framer's
general purposes" and on "the constitutional role of courts with respect to foreign affairs." Id.
Judge Bork explained that section 1350 should not authorize private causes of action in
areas of foreign affairs, "[s]ince international law does not, nor is it likely to, recognize the
capacity of private plaintiffs to litigate its rules in municipal courts" absent an act of Congress
or a treaty ratified by the Senate. Id. at 822.
The Second Circuit has continued to be willing to find a cause of action and proper juris-
diction under section 1350 despite the more restrictive treatment in the District of Columbia
Circuit. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987) (also involving a private plaintiff and a sovereign defendant), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1466 (1988); infra notes 77-95.
For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see infra notes 151-60 and accompanying
text; for a general discussion of the political question doctrine, see infra notes 191-96 and
accompanying text. See also Note, International Human Rights Claims After Tel-Oren v. Lib-
yan Arab Republic: Swan Song for the Legal Lohengrin?, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 107 (1985).
42. Tel-Oren 726 F.2d at 805 n.13 (Bork, J., concurring).
43. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (Order Vacating
Default Judgment and Dismissing Action).
44. Id. at 2.
45. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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time of the ATCA's enactment, in 1789, was absolute immunity for for-
eign sovereigns. The court concluded:
The logical implication would be that if Congress intended to affect
that immunity, it would have done so expressly and specifically, such
that silence would imply, if anything, no intended effect on the general
recognition of foreign sovereign immunity. As such, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
does not provide an exemption to foreign sovereign immunity herein.4 6
Thus, the case was dismissed, since the cause of action did not fit under
any of the exceptions to sovereign immunity in the FSIA.47
Another case, In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, also
attempted to reconcile the interplay between the FSIA and the ATCA.48
This action was brought against the Soviet Union by survivors of the
passengers who died when Soviet military aircraft shot down Korean Air
Lines Flight 007 after it entered Soviet airspace over the Sea of Japan.
The plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction over the Soviet Union under both the
FSIA and the ATCA. The court first addressed jurisdiction under the
FSIA. After rejecting implied waiver of immunity and commercial ex-
ception arguments, the court found that none of the FSIA's immunity
exceptions applied to the case.49 The court then considered whether ju-
risdiction could be sustained under the ATCA as an alternative to the
FSIA. The court also rejected this theory, reasoning that "[t]o hold that
the Alien Tort Claims Act gives a cause of action and subject matter
jurisdiction where the FSIA forbids it would make a nullity of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act.' '50
In contrast to Siderman and In Re Korean Air Lines, the court in
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 51 found jurisdiction
proper under both the ATCA and the FSIA. In Von Dardel, also de-
cided in 1985, an action was brought against the Soviet Union for the
alleged seizure, imprisonment, and possible murder of a Swedish diplo-
mat. Since the case was decided by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, the court was bound by Tel-Oren with its three
divergent opinions of jurisdiction under the ATCA. Nevertheless, the
district court found that the requirements for jurisdiction were met.
52
46. Siderman, slip op. at 3.
47. IM. See Note, Human Rights Jurisdiction over Foreign States Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 594 (1985).
48. Nos. 83-2794, 83-3007, 83-3678, slip op. (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985).
49. Id., slip op. at 5-10. The court noted that defendants did not impliedly waive immu-
nity under § 1605(a)(1) by ratifying international agreements, particularly the United Nations
charter, requiring member nations to respect human rights; nor was the action of the Soviet
military aircraft expected under § 1605 (a)(2) as a "commercial activity" or a "commercial
act" with "direct effects" in the United States.
50. Id., slip. op. at 11. Dismissal of the case was also based on the act of state doctrine.
Id See supra note 32 for a definition of that doctrine.
51. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
52. Id at 259. The plaintiffs were aliens (citizens of Sweden), and the cause of action
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The Von Dardel court cited two reasons for finding that jurisdiction
was not barred by the FSIA. First, the Soviet Union implicitly waived
sovereign immunity by failing to adequately plead it as an affirmative
defense; 53 second, "[t]he statute should be read.., not to extend immu-
nity to clear violations of universally recognized principles of interna-
tional law."' 54 The court based its conclusion on language from the
legislative history of the FSIA in which Congress stated that "the Act
'[incorporated] standards recognized under international law.' ,,55 The
court also cited several opinions that implied that one of these "standards
recognized under international law" was the denial of immunity to sover-
eigns for violations of international law.
56
The language from the legislative history relied on by the court,
however, is taken out of context and is misleading.57 The quoted state-
ment-"the Act '[incorporated] standards recognized under interna-
tional law' "-refers to section 1602 of the Act, the declaration of
sounded in tort. As for the "violation of the law of nations" requirement in the ATCA, Judge
Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren-requiring a showing of a specific private cause of action under
international law-was the most stringent. See supra note 41. The court in Von Dardel looked
to the law of nations in 1789 at the time of the passage of the Alien Tort Claims Act and found
that "infringement of the rights of embassadors [sic]" was one of the primary offenses to which
section 1350 was intended to give jurisdiction. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 258.
53. Just before the decision in Von Dardel, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite con-
clusion in Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). That case involved an action
brought by an American student for damages caused by the refusal to allow her Soviet hus-
band to emigrate. As in Von Dardel, the Soviet Union refused to enter an appearance to
defend the action. In Frolova, however, the court found that this was not tantamount to a
waiver of immunity: "As the Supreme Court indicated in Verlinden, even in a case in which
the defendant has not entered an appearance the district court has an obligation to satisfy itself
that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available before it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 378 (citation omitted). See Comment, Frovola v. USSR: Towards a Human
Rights Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 159
(1987).
54. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254.
55. Id. at 253 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6613).
56. The Von Dardel court relied on two cases that were primarily concerned with the act
of state doctrine. The first case, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), involved the so-called "Bernstein letter" from the
State Department. The Bernstein court's sole concern, however, was that it not be restrained
by the act of state doctrine. Id. at 376. The second source was a dissenting opinion in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), in which Justice White stated that "rea-
sons for nonreview... lose much of their force when the foreign act of state is shown to be a
violation of international law." Id. at 457. As with Bernstein, this opinion concerned only the
act of state doctrine.
57. A federal district court in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638
F. Supp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1466 (1988), also agreed that this language is misleading, after examining the position taken by
the court in Von DardeL For a convincing rejection of the court's reasoning in Von Dardel, see
Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
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purpose.5 8 "Standards recognized under international law," as used in
section 1602, refers to the widely accepted standard of restrictive sover-
eign immunity, and specifically to another statement in section 1602:
"Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned
.... ."59 Nothing in the FSIA or its legislative history supports the inter-
pretation that Congress intended this language to mean that immunity
would be waived for violations of international law.6
°
B. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic
In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 61 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to find jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign based on the ATCA, despite the FSIA's clear
mandate of immunity. The result-oriented decision created a split with
the District of Columbia Circuit by rejecting the holding in Tel-Oren,
particularly Judge Bork's concurring opinion.
(1) The District Court Opinion
During the spring of 1982, Great Britain and the Argentine Repub-
lic (Argentina) became engaged in a conflict in the South Atlantic known
to the English-speaking world as the Falklands War.62 During this war,
the Hercules, an oil tanker owned by United Carriers, Inc. and chartered
58. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
60. The paragraph following the "standards of international law" passage relied on by
the court in Von Dardel reads:
Although the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in
international law, its specific content and application have generally been left to the
courts of individual nations. There, is however, a wide acceptance of the so-called
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; that is, that the sovereign immunity of for-
eign states should be "restricted" to acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or
governmental in nature, as opposed to acts which are either commercial in nature or
those which private persons normally perform.
HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS
6613.
From this discussion it is apparent that the context in which "standards of international
law" is used is in explaining that restrictive sovereign immunity is such a standard-not that
another standard of international law, the denial of immunity for violations of international
law, should be recognized in the FSIA. If anything, the statement that the "specific content
and application [of immunity] have generally been left to the courts of individual nations" goes
against such an assertion. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F.
Supp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466
(1988).
61. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
62. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
by Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., both Liberian corporations, 63 was
making its way up the South Atlantic well outside of the war zones de-
clared by Britain and Argentina. On June 8, 1982, Argentine military
aircraft attacked this neutral vessel, causing extensive deck and hull dam-
age. The Hercules steered for the nearest port of safe refuge, Rio de
Janeiro, where it had to be scuttled, due to the extensive damage and an
undetonated bomb lodged in her hull. Brazilian naval officers investi-
gated the circumstances of the ship's bombing and found nothing that
would violate its neutral status or justify the attack.
64
Amerada Hess Shipping and United Carriers attempted to sue for
recovery of their losses in the Argentine courts, but were prevented from
doing so due to "the politically charged nature of the claim and knowl-
edge that the claim [was] opposed by the Argentine Government. ' 65 The
plaintiffs then brought suit against Argentina in an American federal dis-
trict court, arguing that jurisdiction was proper under the ATCA.66 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the case due to lack of jurisdiction, based on Argentina's sover-
eign immunity under the FSIA. The court held that, despite the
jurisdictional grant of the ATCA, the limitations of the FSIA apply in
any suit against a foreign sovereign.
67
In an opinion by Judge Carter, the district court dismissed the
claims made by the Liberian corporations against Argentina.68 Judge
Carter first considered whether jurisdiction was proper under the FSIA.
He examined section 1604 and the legislative history of the Act, and
found that: "Congress was emphatic that the FSIA be the sole means of
assessing claims of immunity .... A foreign state is subject to jurisdic-
tion in the courts of this nation if, and only if, an FSIA exception em-
powers the court to hear the case."'69 The provision of the FSIA
concerning tort causes of action requires "damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States."' 70 Since the plaintiffs' cause of action in
this case did not meet this requirement, the court concluded that the
claim did not fall within any of the enumerated exceptions to
63. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation is a Liberian corporation owned by Amerada
Hess Corporation, an American corporation incorporated in Delaware. Telephone interview
with Francis Degelmann, Amerada Hess Corp. (May 17, 1988).
United Carriers, Inc. is a Liberian corporation with no connection to American corpora-
tions. The relationship between the Liberian corporations and the United States has not been
an issue in the case thus far. Telephone interview with Raymond J. Burke, Jr., Of Counsel at
Burke & Parsons, attorneys for United Carriers, Inc. (May 17, 1988).
64. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 73-74.
65. Id. at 74 (quoting plaintiff's Verified Complaint).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 74-75.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
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immunity.71
Judge Carter next considered the plaintiffs' contention that "the
Alien Tort Act provides the basis for jurisdiction that the FSIA de-
nies." 72 The plaintiffs argued that the First Congress originally intended
the ATCA to confer jurisdiction on federal courts in suits which allege
violations of international law, even in those cases in which the defendant
is a sovereign. The plaintiffs also reasoned that since the FSIA is silent as
to its effect on the ATCA, and since repeal by implication is disfavored,
the jurisdictional grant of the ATCA is unaffected by the FSIA.
73
The court rejected both the plaintiffs' premise and their conclusion.
As for the premise-that a sovereign would not have been granted immu-
nity in 1789-the court found that although there was evidence that sov-
ereign immunity existed in American law in 1789, "[n]o case law
support[ed] the assertion that a foreign sovereign state would not have
enjoyed immunity in 1789." 74 As for the plaintiffs' conclusion, the court
pointed out that the FSIA does not imply a repeal of the ATCA simply
by eliminating foreign sovereigns from the class of possible defendants.
Such a repeal would occur only if suits under the ATCA were permitted
solely against foreign sovereigns. This is not the case, however, since the
ATCA mentions no specific class of defendants. "Thus it is irrelevant
that repeal by implication is disfavored. The FSIA effects no repeal.
'75
In summary, the district court found that the exceptions to the
FSIA are the only means by which the courts of this country may assert
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. Since this action did not fit under
one of the exceptions, Argentina was entitled to sovereign immunity
under the FSIA. The ATCA cannot be used to assert jurisdiction where
the FSIA clearly denies it-the ATCA must heed the mandate of the
FSIA. The court cited with approval the findings in Siderman and In re
Korean Air Lines, and stated its disagreement with the holding in Von
DardeL76
(2) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court and found jurisdiction over Argentina under the ATCA,
notwithstanding the FSIA.77 In doing so, the court strained to avoid the
71. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 75.
72. Id
73. Id at 75-76.
74. Id at 76.
75. Id
76. In fact, this opinion appears to answer Von Dardel: "The court has addressed plain-
tiffs' arguments in greater detail than they merit, given the clarity of the FSIA's language and
the precedents that support this result. Such attention is warranted only because similar argu-
ments have been accepted-incorrectly, we feel-in Von Dardel v, USSR ...." Id at 77.
77. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987),
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clear language of the FSIA. The court was apparently determined to
assert jurisdiction over Argentina, and disregarded the FSIA in order to
attain that result.
In an opinion by Judge Feinberg, the court first explained that the
alleged acts of Argentina were indeed a violation of international law.
78
The opinion cited international treaties, case law, and treatises to estab-
lish that Argentina's conduct was a violation of the law of nations, 79 and
concluded that "it is beyond controversy that attacking a neutral ship in
international waters, without proper cause . . . violates international
law.",8
0
Next, the court examined the ATCA. At first glance, the facts of
the case appear to qualify it for jurisdiction under the ATCA. This ac-
tion was brought by Liberian corporations for a tort that was a prima
facie violation of customary international law. Argentina, however, ar-
gued that if Congress had intended the ATCA to provide jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns, it would have done so explicitly, since in 1789
the United States recognized absolute sovereign immunity. The jurisdic-
tional grant, therefore, was for individuals only and not for foreign
sovereigns.81
The court paid little attention to this argument concerning the origi-
nal legislative intent of the ATCA. After noting the possibility that
courts in 1789 would have granted sovereign immunity under the alleged
facts, 82 the court dismissed the argument, finding that "[iun construing
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). The opinion also contains a section in which the court
found it had personal jurisdiction over Argentine; this Note, however, is concerned only with
the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity.
78. "It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation." Id. at 423 (quoting IIT
v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
79. The primary international treaties cited by the court included: The Geneva Conven-
tion on the High Seas of 1958 (to which both Argentina and the United States are signatories),
arts. 22 and 23; Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. Id. at 424. Among the cases cited were:
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 133, 161 (1795); The Lusitania, 251 F. Supp. 715, 732-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1918). Id. Treatises cited included: Rappaport, Freedom of the Seas, in 2 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF AMER. FOR. POLICY 387 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 521 reporters' note 1, § 522 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 425.
82. The court based this assertion on the language from Verlinden, which stated that the
grant of foreign sovereign immunity was "a matter of grace and comity on the part of the
United States." Id. (quoting Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,486 (1983)). As
such, the United States had the power to refuse the extension of immunity to a foreign sover-
eign. Perhaps this was true in theory, but as a practical matter, given the adoption of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity by American courts beginning with Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S.
(I Dall.) 77 (1781), and subsequently affirmed in The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812), it would appear that denial of immunity to a foreign sovereign would
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the Alien Tort Statute, 'courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today.' "8s3
Judge Feinberg next explained that to determine whether the ATCA
jrovides jurisdiction over defendants, the court must look to modern in-
ternational law.84 For authority the court cited two law review articles
finding that "[tihe modern view.., is that sovereigns are not immune
from suit for their violations of international law."8 5 This finding served
as a basis for the rest of the court's analysis. With these premises in
place, the court concluded that, since immunity would be denied under
international law for the sinking of a neutral vessel on the high seas,
Argentina should be denied immunity in this case, and that the ATCA
provided proper jurisdiction over Argentina.
8 6
Argentina advanced the argument that, regardless of the jurisdic-
tional grant of the ATCA, the exclusive means for obtaining jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns is the FSIA. In his review of the FSIA, Judge
Feinberg cited the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States for the proposition that "[w]here fairly possible, a United States
statute is to be construed so as not to bring it into conflict with interna-
tional law."'8 7 This maxim led him to conclude that "[s]ince interna-
tional law would deny immunity in these circumstances, we would
construe the FSIA to grant immunity only if Congress clearly expressed
such an intent."88s
While the court addressed the issue of whether the FSIA is the sole
happen only under exceptional circumstances. As an example of denial of immunity to a sov-
ereign, the court in Amerada Hess cites The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283
(1822). That case involved the assertion of jurisdiction over prize property aboard a foreign
ship that was located in an American port. The narrow holding stands for the proposition
that, if a foreign ship is in American territory with prize property, "whatever may be the
exemption of the public ship herself, and of her armament and munitions of war, the prize
property which she brings into our ports is liable to the jurisdiction of our courts.... ." Id. at
354. The circumstances under which immunity was denied in The Santissima Trinidad, espe-
cially considering that the property under question was located in the United States, are so far
removed from the facts of Amerada Hess that any conclusion based on analogy is unfounded.
83. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 816, 881
(2d Cir. 1980)).
84. Judge Feinberg also stated that "Itihe Alien Tort Statute is no more than a jurisdic-
tional grant based on international law. The evolving standards of international law govern
who is within the statute's jurisdictional grant as clearly as they govern what conduct creates
jurisdiction." Id
85. Id See Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A "How To"
Approach, 7 WHrrUER L. REv. 713, 733-34 (1985); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterri-
torialActs of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 221-32 (1983). For an examination
of these articles, see infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
86. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426.
87. Id (quoting REsTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 134).
88. Id
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basis for resolving questions of sovereign immunity, it concluded that
Congress did not intend for the comprehensive nature of the Act to ex-
tend to violations of international law or to actions brought under the
ATCA.89 To support its position, the court examined the legislative in-
tent of the FSIA, focusing on the congressional goal of implementing a
theory of restrictive sovereign immunity. The court found that
"[i]nternational law violations are simply not discussed in the statute or
the legislative history outside of the commercial context. Thus, interna-
tional law violations are not the focus of the 'comprehensive' language of
the drafters of the FSIA . "...-90 As for the other goals of the FSIA-"to
place immunity decisions firmly in the courts, and to codify procedures
for suits against sovereigns"-the court found that they also "do not sug-
gest an intent to provide immunity for violations of international law
outside of the commercial context." 91
The last rationale advanced by Judge Feinberg for the denial of im-
munity is similar to the one presented in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. 92 The Second Circuit focused on the "incorporating
standards recognized under international law" language of the legislative
history:
The "central premise" of the FSIA was that "decisions on claims
by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the judiciary
on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards recog-
nized under international law." Thus, although Congress did not focus
on suits for violations of international law, it clearly expected courts to
apply the international law of sovereign immunity. As we have seen,
under international law Argentina would not be granted sovereign im-
munity in this case. Therefore, a grant of immunity here would fly in
the face of this central premise.93
The court found that since Congress did not express a clear intent to
preempt either the immunity rules of international law or the ATCA, the
jurisdictional grant under the ATCA was still valid.94 Thus, the court
denied sovereign immunity to Argentina and asserted jurisdiction over
the case.
95
89. Judge Feinberg stated:
Congress was not focusing on violations of international law when it enacted the
FSIA. Therefore we do not believe these pronouncements were intended to cover all
violations of international law in general and actions under the Alien Tort Statute in
particular.
Id.
90. Id. at 427.
91. Id.
92. 623 F. Supp. 246, 253-54 (1985).
93. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 427 (citation omitted). While the district court rebutted
this argument in its discussion of Von Dardel, the Second Circuit failed to address this rebuttal
in the opinion. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
94. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 427 (citation omitted).
95. In addition to finding subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA and the FSIA,
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C. Flaws in the Amerada Hess Analysis
The rationale offered by the Second Circuit in support of its decision
is so tenuous that nearly every major premise is open to challenge. This
section will examine the principal components of the court's argument in
the order in which they were presented in the opinion.
(1) The Proper Role of the ATCA
In describing the ATCA, the Second Circuit determined that "[tihe
Alien Tort Statute is no more than a jurisdictional grant based on inter-
national law" and that the court must look to standards of international
law to determine both "who is within the statute's jurisdictional grant"
and "what conduct creates jurisdiction. '96 After this examination the
court posited that whether the ATCA provides jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign should be determined by consulting international law.
97
Close examination of the language of the ATCA, however, suggests
that the Second Circuit erroneously described the jurisdictional grant.
Under the ATCA, district courts are given "original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations."98 This jurisdictional grant is based on international law to
the extent that the alleged conduct is a "violation of the law of nations."
Although the district court must look to international law to determine
whether the alleged conduct is within the jurisdiction of federal courts,
the statute is completely silent as to a class of defendants.99 The statu-
tory language does not indicate that international law is to play any role
in determining the class of defendants over whom the district court may
properly assert jurisdiction. The results of recent cases support this
assertion. 00
Undaunted by the lack of support for its position, the court looked
before the court can try the case it must also find personal jurisdiction over Argentina. Statu-
tory personal jurisdiction is covered in 28 U.S.C. § 1330 of the FSIA and is satisfied if subject
matter jurisdiction exists and process has been served under § 1608 of the Act. Constitutional
personal jurisdiction standards are satisfied with a showing of "minimum contacts," as re-
quired by International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Texas Trading v. Fed-
eral Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); infra
notes 172-79 and accompanying text. The remainder of the Amerada Hess opinion concerned
the issue of personal jurisdiction and is beyond the scope of this Note.
96. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
99. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
100. See, eg., Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Nos. 83-2794, 83-3007, 83-3678 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985); Siderman v.
Republic of Argen., No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (Order Vacating
Default Judgment and Dismissing Action); Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C.
1985).
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to international law to determine whether the ATCA would grant juris-
diction over a foreign sovereign and found "[t]he modern view.., is that
sovereigns are not immune from suit for their violations of international
law." 0 1 This assertion served as a basis for most of the other court's
findings. In support of this sweeping assertion, the court cited the work
of two commentators. 0 2 These articles, however, provide only indirect
support at best. Professor Paust's article discussed the right of the
United Nations to intervene in matters not within the jurisdiction of a
particular nation, and argued generally for denial of immunity to sover-
eigns involved in international criminal activity. 0 3 The second article
cited by Judge Feinberg provides possible arguments for litigators to use
in attempting to sue foreign sovereigns, but provides little or no authority
for the view that sovereigns are not immune from suit for violations of
international law. 104
101. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425.
102. Bazyler, supra note 85, at 733-34; Paust, supra note 85, at 221-32.
103. The article is mainly concerned with suits involving international terrorism. Profes-
sor Paust discussed, as "the most general recognition of the nonimmunity of foreign States
under international law," article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter:
Although it merely declares that the United Nations is not authorized by the Charter
"to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state," it has been recognized that article 2(7) implicitly confirms competence to in-
tervene in matters that are not "essentially within" the jurisdiction of a particular
State and, moreover, that a State's violation of international law is precisely one of
those circumstances that are not "essentially within" the domestic jurisdiction of a
particular State.
Paust, supra note 85, at 221.
This Section merely establishes that it is possible to interpret article 2(7) as implicitly
authorizing the United Nations to "intervene," presumably through the International Court of
Justice, in matters not within the jurisdiction of a particular nation. It does not relate to the
question of immunity granted to a foreign sovereign by the domestic courts of another nation.
Regarding the extension of immunity to foreign sovereigns in domestic courts, Professor
Paust concluded: "For these reasons, domestic notions of 'sovereign immunity' or 'acts of
State' should not be applied in domestic courts so as to thwart a universal sanctions effort
directed at international criminal activity." Id. at 226. The argument is concerned with juris-
diction over sovereigns in criminal actions, not civil actions such as Amerada Hess.
104. The article is essentially a "how-to" guide running through the entire process of liti-
gating an action involving human rights violations under international law. The section cited
by Judge Feinberg is titled "Sovereign Immunity: A Major Pitfall in Human Rights Litigation
Against Foreign Sovereigns." Bazyler, supra note 85, at 732. After examining the possible
exceptions to immunity under the FSIA, Professor Bazyler advises that if none of the excep-
tions applies to a particular case, "it should be argued that the FSIA is not the exclusive means
of removing foreign sovereign immunity .... For instance, it can be argued that the ATCA,
providing federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction for gross human rights violations, also
removes sovereign immunity for actions based upon such violations." Id. at 733. The article
then asserts, in all too familiar language:
Even if the ATCA, when passed in 1789, did not allow suits against foreign sover-
eigns for torture, the Filartiga court made clear that the ATCA is a dynamic statute
and must be interpreted in light of modern standards of international law. Since
modern international law would deny sovereign immunity for gross international
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The legislative history of the FSIA briefly addressed the issue of sov-
ereign immunity from the perspective of international law: "Although
the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in
international law, its specific content and application have generally been
left to the courts of the individual nations."10 5
In the United States, the constitutional framework delegates solely
to Congress the authority to confer jurisdiction to federal district courts.
Federal courts in the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction:
they can assert subject matter jurisdiction only over those cases in which
they have congressional authority to do So. 1 0 6 Therefore, a federal court
may not look to modern international law to determine whether a federal
court can assert jurisdiction over a sovereign. Instead, it must look to the
jurisdictional grants of Congress. Through the FSIA, Congress has indi-
cated to the federal courts which cases they can and cannot hear when
the case involves a foreign sovereign. Whether or not the amorphous
body of international law would deny immunity for violations of interna-
tional law is irrelevant. Perhaps cases like Amerada Hess should be
heard in federal district courts. It is also conceivable that international
law mandates hearing these cases. These questions, however, should be
addressed by the legislative branch, since a federal court cannot hear a
case when Congress has decided not to give it jurisdiction.
(2) Provisions of the FSIA
The Amerada Hess court next analyzed the provisions of the FSIA.
The court introduced this analysis by quoting section 134 of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: "Where fairly pos-
sible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to bring it into
conflict with international law."'10 7 Given its earlier finding that interna-
human rights violations, the ATCA today would deny sovereign immunity to foreign
sovereigns is such claims.
Id at 733-34. The article cited no authority to support this assertion. The structure of the
argument is similar to that of Chief Judge Feinberg: a proposition, for which no support is
given, serves as a vital premise to the main contention.
105. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6613.
106. Both Article III of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 define federal
jurisdictional boundaries:
[The Judiciary Act of 1789] thus established the basic doctrine that although the
outer limits of permissible federal judicial power are delineated by the Constitution,
the actual scope of that jurisdiction at any given time is governed by the relevant
jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress .... [I]t now is settled beyond any doubt
that with respect to the federal courts Congress constitutionally is free to grant or
withhold subject matter jurisdiction as it desires, within the ultimate boundaries
marked out by Article III.
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 13 (1985) (citations omitted).
107. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir.
1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 134), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
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tional law would deny immunity under the circumstances of Amerada
Hess, the court maintained that it "would construe the FSIA to grant
immunity only if Congress clearly expressed such an intent."'10
8
A close examination of the context of section 134, however, suggests
a different interpretation than that reached by the Second Circuit. The
comment to section 134 states: "The principle of interpretation in [sec-
tion] 134 is influenced by the fact that the courts are obliged to give effect
to a federal statute even if it is inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of
international law . .. "19 Section 135(1)(a) provides: "An Act of Con-
gress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the
Act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear and if the Act and
the earlier or provision rule cannot be fairly reconciled."' 10 The legisla-
tive history of the FSIA states that the Act "sets forth the sole and ex-
clusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign
immunity," and "is intended to preempt any other State or Federal law
(excluding applicable international agreements) for according immunity
to foreign sovereigns."' In addition, it is axiomatic that international
law is incorporated into federal common law. 112 Taken together, these
factors demonstrate that Congress intended the FSIA to supercede any
previous, conflicting standards regarding sovereign immunity in the
courts of the United States. Even assuming, arguendo, that international
law would not grant immunity to the defendants in Amerada Hess, the
FSIA specifically supercedes this mandate.
The Second Circuit acknowledged the comprehensive nature of the
statute, but ultimately concluded that the mandate of the FSIA was not
intended to cover violations of international law. The court based its
conclusion on the absence of language in either the statute or the legisla-
tive history specifically addressing its effect on violations of international
law.113 This conclusion is contrary to both the legislative history of the
Act and subsequent case law.
First, the legislative history reveals that Congress did consider how
violations of international law should affect immunity when it enacted
108. Id.
109. RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 134 comment at 76.
110. Id. § 135(l)(a) at 77-78.
111. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6610.
112. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their
determination"); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (in the absence of a congres-
sional enactment, United States courts are "bound by the law of nations which is a part of the
law of the land"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the law of nations
... has always been a part of the federal common law").
113. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426-27.
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the FSIA. "Section 1605(a)(3) would, in two categories of cases, deny
immunity where 'rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue.' "114 The violations of international law referred to in
section 1605(a)(3) are expropriations of property by foreign sovereigns
without the adequate and prompt compensation required by interna-
tional law. The absence of a specific exemption from immunity for viola-
tions of international law similar to that in Amerada Hess does not
indicate that Congress failed to consider such violations in promulgating
the FSIA. Rather, it merely indicates that Congress did not wish to deny
immunity for such actions. 115
The fact that the FSIA does not specifically mention the type of
violation of international law found in Amerada Hess does not exclude
the case from the mandate of the FSIA. The comprehensive language of
the statute and the legislative history indicate that any issue of sovereign
immunity is governed by the Act. Section 1602 of the FSIA states:
"Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by
the courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the
principles set forth in this chapter." 116 Section 1604 provides that "a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to
1607 of this chapter."' 1 7 The legislative history affirms the comprehen-
sive nature of the Act: "This bill ... sets forth the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised
by foreign states before Federal and State courts of the United States."' 1
18
The all-inclusive nature of the FSIA is emphasized throughout its legisla-
tive history.1 19
Case law has also found that the FSIA was intended to broadly ad-
dress the issue of sovereign immunity. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the FSIA "contains a comprehensive set of legal standards
114. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 19, reprinted in 1976U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6618.
115. See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) ("Where Con-
gress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions
are not to be implied, in the absence of eveidence of a contrary legislative intent.").
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
117. Id § 1604.
118. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6610 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., id. reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6610 ("Aside from
setting forth comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity, the bill prescribes: the juris-
diction of U.S. district courts in cases involving foreign states .... ."); id at 13, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6611 (Section 1330 of the FSIA "provides a compre-
hensive jurisdictional scheme in cases involving foreign states."); id. at 14, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6613 (The FSIA "sets forth the legal standards under
which Federal and State courts would henceforth determine all claims of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.").
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governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state
or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities." 120 The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the FSIA in a similar man-
ner: "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act insulates foreign states
from the exercise of federal jurisdiction, except under the conditions
specified in the Act." 121 These cases, combined with the statutory and
legislative language mentioned above, seem to indicate that any and all
issues of sovereign immunity, including that in Amerada Hess, should be
determined exclusively by the standards enunciated in the FSIA.
Based on its finding that the FSIA does not explicitly apply to viola-
tions of international law, the Amerada Hess court concluded that the
FSIA does not preempt the jurisdictional grant of section 1350.122 Aside
from obvious language to the contrary contained in the FSIA's legislative
history, 123 this analysis of the effect of the FSIA on the ATCA is mis-
leading. Pursuant to its constitutionally conferred powers1 24 and the
principle that federal courts possess limited jurisdiction, Congress has
enacted a number of statutory grants of federal jurisdiction, 1 25 including
section 1350. The FSIA does not specifically mention any of these grants
of jurisdiction. But, by its comprehensive nature, it applies equally to all
of them, imposing a limitation on the class of possible defendants over
which jurisdiction can be asserted. The effect of the FSIA on the ATCA
is not preemption; it merely eliminates foreign sovereigns from the class
of possible defendants, unless the case fits under one of the exceptions in
the FSIA. 
126
(3) Central Premise of the FSIA
As a further rationale for its denial of immunity to Argentina, the
Second Circuit stated that the FSIA's central premise is that sovereign
120. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (emphasis added).
121. O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 1086 (1984).
122. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F. 2d 421, 427 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
123. The FSIA "is intended to preempt any other State or Federal law.., for according
immunity to foreign sovereigns .. " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6610.
124. The constitutional basis for Congress' power to establish federal courts and their ju-
risdiction derives from the following language of article III: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
125. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question); id. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship);
id. § 1333 (admiralty, maritime, and prize cases); id. § 1334 (bankruptcy cases and proceed-
ings); id. § 1337 (commerce and anti-trust regulations); id. § 1338 (patents, plant variety pro-
tection, copyrights, trade-marks, and unfair competition); id. § 1343 (civil rights and elective
franchise).
126. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
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immunity decisions should be based on "a statutory regime which incor-
porates standards recognized under international law." 127 The court in-
ferred from this premise that Congress intended to apply international
law to questions of sovereign immunity. Further, because international
law would deny immunity to Argentina, a judicial grant of immunity
would "fly in the face" of this central premise. 128 When read in its
proper context, however, the meaning of the central premise differs from
the court's interpretation. The quoted language is taken from a passage
which explains that, in order to achieve conformity with widely accepted
standards of international law, the FSIA is a codification of the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity.1 29 It does not imply that immunity
should be denied in this case because it would be denied under interna-
tional law. 130
In summary, the Second Circuit's decision was apparently designed
to circumvent the clear language of the FSIA. The lack of cogency sug-
gests that the court attempted to justify a preconceived decision to assert
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Regardless of whether a court should hear the case under interna-
tional law, Congress has affirmatively decided to exclude cases like Amer-
ada Hess from federal courts through sovereign immunity.
1 31
Jurisdiction simply may not be asserted under the current statutory
structure.
The remainder of this Note examines the merits of allowing federal
jurisdiction over cases such as Amerada Hess, proposes a possible change
127. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 427 (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMi. NEWS 6613) (emphasis in original).
128. I
129. The full passage reads:
Section 1602 sets forth the central premise of the bill: That decisions on claims by
foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a
statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized under international law.
Although the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in
international law, its specific content and application have generally been left to the
courts of individual nations. There is, however, a wide acceptance of the so-called
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; that is, that the sovereign immunity of for-
eign states should be "restricted" to cases involving acts of a foreign state which are
sovereign or governmental in nature, as opposed to acts which are either commercial
in nature or those which private persons normally perform.
HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6613.
130. This was argued in Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985). See supra
text accompanying notes 51-60
131. See, eg., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603)
("Whatever one thinks of the merits of appellants' claims, the allegations fail to allege that
Congress intended to subject such acts to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
The ATCA should not be used to provide a basis for jurisdiction that the FSIA denies.").
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in the FSIA that would allow such cases to be heard, and explores the
disadvantages and advantages of such a change.
III. Proposal to Amend the FSIA to Confer Original
Jurisdiction over Violations of International Law
As the world grows smaller and nations become more interdepen-
dent, peace and order among the nations of the world become more im-
portant. The development of an international legal order plays an
important role in the maintenance of international stability. The devel-
opment of international laws to guide the behavior of nations increased
dramatically in the years following World War II. The proliferation of
international treaties and conventions concerning human rights1 32 and
environmental issues133 evidences these world-wide developments.
Domestic courts also play an important role in the development of
international law. As one legal scholar has noted: "[T]he decentralized
quality of international law places a special burden upon all legal institu-
tions at the national level. Domestic courts are agents of a developing
international legal order, as well as servants of various national interests;
this double role helps to overcome the institutional deficiencies on a su-
pranational level."1 34
It is in a nation's best interest to protect itself and its citizens from
violations of international law. Domestic courts, as the principal en-
forcement vehicles of these legal principles, should hear cases so that the
United States may participate in the maintenance of international or-
der.1 35 Indeed, as one commentator has said "For the judiciary to...
grant immunity to violators of international law would be to compromise
its commitment to law, to threaten its independence, and, in effect, to
sanction and promote official lawlessness that is otherwise condemned by
132. For conventions and treaties on human rights, see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 33,
at 66 n.65.
133. For conventions and treaties on environmental issues, see e.g., Agreement on the
Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 13; Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291; Agreement
on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23, 1972, United States-USSR,
11 I.L.M. 761; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada,
11 I.L.M. 694; Convention on the High Seas, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective Dec. 10, 1959); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, Sept. 15, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966); Interim Convention on the Conservation of the North
Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105.
134. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMEsTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OR-
DER 65 (1964).
135. See Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims
Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 211, 239 n.134 (1985).
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the international community."
136
In this spirit, the decision of the Second Circuit in Amerada Hess
may be seen as an admirable attempt to provide a forum for adjudication
of international law violations. The attempt is futile, however, because it
must run up against a clear and solid mandate from Congress that sover-
eigns shall be immune, except in the specific exceptions enumerated in
the FSIA. Even with the strained reasoning employed in Amerada Hess,
it is impossible to escape a Congressional mandate in such clear
language.
It follows that, consistent with the commitment of the United States
to the development of international legal order, American courts should
hear cases with facts similar to Amerada Hess. Amerada Hess is unique
because the plaintiffs alleged a violation of international law committed
outside of the defendant nation's territory. The plaintiffs were unable to
bring their action in Argentine courts; realistically, therefore, their only
forum was the United States federal courts. Under the current statutory
structure, however, federal courts may not hear a case with facts similar
to Amerada Hess since jurisdiction is disallowed due to the nation's sov-
ereign immunity.
This inequity could be solved by amending the FSIA to provide that
a party implicitly waives sovereign immunity if it commits acts which
violate international law. The following is a model amendment that
would accomplish this goal (italicized parts represent additions to the
current Act):
§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter-
(f) A "violation of international law" is a violation of a rule of interna-
tional law that is universally accepted among civilized nations. Evidence
of universal acceptance may be found, inter alia, in multinational con-
ventions and treaties, judicial decisions, customs and uses of civilized
nations, and the works ofJurists and commentators.
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either ex-
plicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accord-
ance with the terms of the waiver; or in which the foreign state has
impliedly waived its immunity by committing an act which violates in-
ternational law; .... 137
136. Paust, supra note 85, at 248. "Among states as well as among men, justice is a sacred
law .... On states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incumbent." Id at
249 (quoting Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J.,
charge to the grand jury)).
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605 (1976) (altered as indicated).
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A. Possible Objections to the Proposed Amendment
Such an amendment raises several concerns. The most obvious is
the threat of a flood of litigation, brought by both domestic and foreign
plaintiffs under the ATCA, to redress grievances against foreign sover-
eigns. This concern is especially significant in light of the perennial prob-
lem of overcrowded federal court dockets. Another concern is the effect
such an assertion of jurisdiction would have on foreign relations, specifi-
cally on the comity that exists between nations. Asserting jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign is a bold act that may be viewed unfavorably by
that nation and by the rest of the world. A final concern is the effect of
the political question doctrine on such cases, and whether the judiciary
should hear such cases at all. Since the adjudication by one nation of the
international acts of another nation is likely to exacerbate tensions be-
tween nations, such decisions are perhaps more properly reached by the
political branches of government-executive and legislative-and the use
of diplomacy.
The following sections discuss a number of factors that will allay
these concerns. First, certain substantive and procedural hurdles cur-
rently exist in bringing a suit against a foreign sovereign that will provide
limitations sufficient to reduce the number of suits against foreign sover-
eigns and prevent a possible flood of litigation. Second, asserting juris-
diction in these cases will affect foreign relations in either a neutral or
possibly a positive way. Finally, although the decision to hear such cases
will involve application of the political question doctrine, the doctrine
will not prohibit jurisdiction in all cases.
B. Substantive and Procedural Barriers
(1) Requirements of International Law
One inherent limitation to the proposed exception to immunity is
that the alleged act must demonstratively violate a universally accepted
norm of international law. This burden is very difficult to meet, and will
preclude all but a few actions from qualifying for the implied waiver of
immunity.
Establishing that an act is a violation of international law requires
examination of the ways in which binding international law is created.
Traditional notions of customary international law emphasized the im-
portance of state practice in the creation of binding law. 138 A norm of
international law became binding only after states had shown their will-
138. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (in determining international law,
"where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations"); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (the law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting... the
general usage and practice of nations"); see A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN IN-
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ingness to be bound by the norm, and that their compliance derived from
a belief that the norm was law. 139 The traditional method developed be-
cause of the absence of international organizations capable of creating
international law through more deliberate processes. The advent of inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations has resulted in the
development of a new mode of international law, based primarily on for-
mal international agreements and conventions which serve as evidence of
the consensus of world opinion. 140 This newer form of international law
views the international agreements not necessarily as binding in and of
themselves, but as evidence of a binding norm based on their "number
and intended legal status..., the language used in the documents, in-
cluding the nature of the proposed sanctions, . . . the specificity with
which the event or conduct in question is defined..., and whether it
appears to have the overwhelming support of states."
141
Plaintiffs attempting to invoke jurisdiction under the ATCA have
had the burden of proving that an act was a violation of the law of na-
tions. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a threshold issue was whether official
torture constituted a violation of international law. 142 The court found
that "[t]he requirement that a rule command the 'general assent of civi-
lized nations' to become binding upon them all is a stringent one."
143
Nevertheless, after examining conventions, treaties, and case law dealing
with official torture, the court concluded that due to the universal con-
demnation of the use of torture by nations, and the renunciation of the
use of torture in numerous international agreements, torture committed
by a state official violated international human rights law and hence the
law of nations. 44
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals dealt with the question of whether torture committed
by a non-state actor and terrorism were violations of the law of nations
TERNATIONAL LAw 3-4 (1971); W. FR1EDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 121-23 (1964).
139. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 72-75. These commentators state in perti-
nent part:
It is the traditional view that international instruments constitute only one type of
state practice which exists along side of other types. To determine whether conduct
violates customary international law one must therefore look at the frequency of der-
ogations from the norm and at whether compliance stems from a belief that the norm
is law.
Id. at 72.
140. See Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 25 (1978).
141. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 74 (footnote omitted).
142. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
143. I at 881.
144. Id at 880.
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under section 1350.145 Of the three judges on the panel, only Judge Ed-
wards directly addressed the issue. Judge Edwards regarded torture not
carried out under color of state law as a "fringe area" in international
law only "gradually emerging" due to a lack of consensus among nations
on the subject. 146 Heeding the warning of the United States Supreme
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, he stated: "I am not
prepared to extend the definition of the 'law of nations' absent direction
from the Supreme Court. The degree of 'codification or consensus' is
simply too slight."' 147
Regarding the issue of whether international terrorism is a violation
of international law, Judge Edwards reviewed the divergent views
throughout the world concerning legitimacy of the use of terrorism and
concluded that "the nations of the world are so divisively split on the
legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area
of harmony or consensus .... Given this division, I do not believe that
under current law terrorist attacks amount to law of nations
violations." 4
8
The analyses given in Filartiga and Tel-Oren of whether an act is a
violation of international law illustrates the difficulty in overcoming this
hurdle. Although the list of offenses which are violations of international
law has expanded beyond the original offenses of piracy, safe-conduct
violations, and violations against ambassadors, 149 the requirement of
"universal acceptance among civilized nations" is an imposing burden.
145. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985); see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 792 (Edwards, J., concurring).
147. "[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it."
Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
148. Id. at 795.
149. The original offenses, according to Blackstone, were: "1. Violation of safe-conducts;
2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors [sic]; and, 3. Piracy." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 68, 72, quoted in 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION IN THE His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 459 (1953). American courts have recognized the following as
violations of international law: piracy, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 157
(1820); slave trading, United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 851 (D. Mass. 1822)
(No 15,551); seizing the contents of a neutral vessel, Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 811
(D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); counterfeiting foreign currency, United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S.
479 (1887); harrassing foreign diplomats, Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939); blocking an innocent passage through territorial
waters, Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960);
passport fraud, Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864-65 (D. Md. 1961);
kidnapping, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974); official torture,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); arbitrary detention, Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981); and infractions against the laws of war, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1945). See
Comment, Hunt v. Galtieri: A Hypothetical Scenario for Holding International Aggressors
Civilly [sic] Liable in American Courts, 33 EMORY L.J. 211, 229-30 & nn. 91-101 (1984).
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If strictly applied by federal courts under the amendment proposed by
this Note, the burden of proof would substantially limit the number of
cases qualifying under the exception. The plaintiffs in Amerada Hess,
however, would have sustained this burden. As explained in the Second
Circuit opinion, attacks of neutral ships on the high seas have long been
of universal concern to the nations of the world and are analogous to
piracy, one of the first acts deemed a violation of international law.150
(2) The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine provides another limitation to suit against
foreign sovereigns. The doctrine prevents domestic courts from ruling
on acts committed by a foreign sovereign within its own territory. 151 The
doctrine is really a form of issue preclusion 152 which arises independent
from the issue of jurisdiction. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino 153 the United States Supreme Court observed that "[t]he act of state
doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this coun-
try from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory." 154 The Court
found, however, that the doctrine was not "compelled either by the in-
herent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions
seem to imply, . . . or by some principle of international law."1155 The
Court ultimately held that the act of state doctrine precluded it from
passing on the validity of certain expropriation actions taken by Cuba,
but based the holding in large part on the unsettled nature of the interna-
tional law concerning expropriation of alien property.
Although the act of state doctrine precludes many cases against for-
150. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
151. The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine was given by Chief Justice
Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 254, 259 (1897) (suit by an American citizen
against recognized Venezuelan head of state barred by act of state doctrine):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
152. The phrase "issue preclusion" is used in this Note in a generic sense-it describes a
doctrine which precludes issues from being heard. It should not be confused with the civil
procedure term of art synonymous with collateral estoppel.
153. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
154. Id. at 401.
155. Id at 421 (citations omitted). The Court, in refusing to lay down an "inflexible and
all-encompassing rule," named three factors to be considered in act of state doctrine analysis:
(1) "the degree of codification or consensus" of the applicable area of international law; (2) the
importance of the issue to national foreign relations; and (3) whether the government that
perpetrated the act continues to exist. Id at 428; see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 107-
08.
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eign sovereigns by eliminating any alleged actions concerning acts done
within the sovereign's own territory, the doctrine has exceptions. First,
Sabbatino indicates that judicial review may be proper in areas of inter-
national law where there is consensus among nations. 156 The second no-
table exception is the Bernstein exception. 157 In Bernstein, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals waived the act of state doctrine, permitting the
lower court to accept evidence concerning the validity of certain acts of
Nazi officials upon a request from the Department of State.158 The
Supreme Court later adopted the Bernstein exception in a case involving
Cuban expropriation:
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with
the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doc-
trine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing, we of course
adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the act of state
doctrine.... [T]he reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases
159
The act of state doctrine would limit the cases heard under the pro-
posed amendment to the FSIA by eliminating from judicial review those
actions involving acts by sovereigns committed within their own terri-
tory. The main exception to this would occur if the executive branch,
through the State Department, specifically advised that the doctrine
should be waived and the case should be heard.16  In effect, the proposed
156. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 437. In any event, consensus among nations would be
necessary to meet the "violation of international law" requirement. Justice Harlan, writing for
the Sabbatino majority, explained this "consensus" factor:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judi-
ciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensi-
tive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with
international justice.
Id. at 428.
157. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954).
158. Id. at 376.
159. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972); see
Comment, supra note 149, at 252-53.
160. The validity of the Bernstein exception, however, has not gone unchallenged. In First
Nat'l City Bank, although the majority opinion adopted the Bernstein exception, four dissent-
ing Justices thought that the Bernstein letter was "only one-and not necessarily the most
important" consideration in deciding whether to apply the act of state doctrine. First Nat'7 City
Bank, 406 U.S. at 788. Two Justices concurred in the result, but also questioned the validity of
the Bernstein exception.
In a more recent case, the Second Circuit questioned whether the Bernstein exception
should be controlling in the decision to apply the act of state doctrine, noting: "Whether to
invoke the act of state doctrine is ultimately and always a judicial question." Allied Bank Int'l
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additional exception would apply only to violations of international law
which occurred outside of the territory of the sovereign, unless the execu-
tive branch deemed the case proper for hearing based on political and
foreign relations factors. Thus, the act of state doctrine would not affect
cases with facts similar to Amerada Hess, in which the violation took
place outside the sovereign's territory.
(3) Forum Non Conveniens
Another possible limitation on suits against foreign sovereigns is the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine allows a court to dis-
miss cases over which it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction if
the forum is sufficiently inconvenient to prevent substantial justice and if
a more convenient forum exists. 161 Factors to be considered in a forum
non conveniens analysis include access to sources of proof, ability to use
compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining wit-
nesses, "and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive."
162
If the alternative forum is outside of the United States, the action
may be dismissed.1 63 A court has discretion to retain jurisdiction in an
inconvenient forum if it appears that the alternative forum is unlikely to
produce a just result. 164 Thus, dismissal may be defeated if the opponent
to the motion demonstrates bias on the part of the alternative forum.165
This discretion was used in Filartiga. When the plaintiff originally tried
v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934
(1985).
One commentator analyzed the divergence of opinion as follows:
This divergence stems from the different emphasis placed on the two rationales un-
derlying the doctrine. The Justices emphasizing the rationale of interbranch comity
espouse deference to the executive's wishes, whereas those interpreting the doctrine
as a form of "political question" inquiry deny that executive suggestion bears any
relevance to the issue. Under the political question interpretation, no executive sug-
gestion can affect the operation of the act of state doctrine because the issue is simply
not cognizable in United States courts.
Comment, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 127, 177 n.281 (1986).
161. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 87-91
(1985) (discussing forum non conveniens).
162. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
163. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing an action involving an
airplane crash because Scotland, the situs of the crash, was a more appropriate forum).
164. Id1 at 254 n.22. The Piper Court noted that ."where the remedy offered by the other
forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the
initial requirement may not be satisfied." Id See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 161, at 89 (dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens requires that
there be an alternative forum in which the suit can be prosecuted and where the parties can
obtain complete relief).
165. See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445,455 (D. Del. 1978).
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to bring suit in Paraguay, his attorney was shackled to a wall and
threatened with death. 166 In the district court, the defendant moved to
dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens; however, since the case
was dismissed solely on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this issue was
not before the Second Circuit on appeal. 167 Upon remand, the district
court retained jurisdiction, holding that nothing refuted the plaintiff's
evidence that further resort to the Paraguayan courts would be futile. 168
Under the proposed amendment to the FSIA, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens would eliminate those suits which should properly be
pursued in an alternative forum. Since the suit would be against a for-
eign sovereign, the courts of the sovereign defendant would rarely be seen
as a viable alternative. In certain cases, however, the courts of a foreign
plaintiff could provide adequate relief and greater convenience to the par-
ties involved. If bringing the action in the alternative forum would result
in injustice, the suit could be heard in the courts of the United States.
Thus, the proposed exception to immunity would apply to plaintiffs
unable to seek redress for their grievances in another forum. In Amerada
Hess, the plaintiffs originally attempted to bring suit in Argentina, but
were prevented from pursuing their claim due to the political nature of
the action. 169 Apparently, there was no attempt to bring suit in a Libe-
rian court, 170 nor any attempt on the part of the district court to dismiss
the case. 171 Forum non conveniens would not defeat an attempt to bring
this action in an American court.
(4) Personal Jurisdiction
To bring a foreign defendant before a United States court, proper
personal jurisdiction is necessary. Statutory personal jurisdiction is eas-
ily attained under the FSIA. 172 Due process requires an additional show-
ing of "sufficient contacts with the forum, so that the exercise of
jurisdiction will not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice;"
166. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
167. Id. at 879-80.
168. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
169. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988); Joint Brief for the Appellants at 8-12, Amerada
Hess, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603).
170. Joint Brief for the Appellants at 8-12, Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987)
(Nos. 86-7602 and 86-7603).
171. See Amerada Hess Shipping Co. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982) provides: "Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall
exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsec-
tion (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." See id. § 1608. Section
1608 provides clear procedures for serving both foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.
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the standard required by International Shoe Co. v. Washington.173 In an
international suit, the "forum" to which the contacts must relate is the
United States. 174 Jurisdiction based on the defendant's property in the
United States is eliminated under the FSIA.
175
Since a suit arising under the proposed amendment to the FSIA
would involve a tort occurring outside of the United States, 176 the con-
tacts between the foreign sovereign and the United States would have to
be substantial enough to justify an assertion of general jurisdiction.
177
Contacts sufficient to justify specific jurisdiction 178 over a sovereign, in a
cause of action arising out of the foreign sovereign's activities within the
United States, would be insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction in a
cause of action arising outside of the United States.179
Satisfying due process requirements for personal jurisdiction would
limit suits under the proposed FSIA amendment to those involving de-
fendants which have sufficient contacts with the United States to justify
173. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See
Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428. Regarding the application of the International Shoe standard
to suits against foreign sovereigns, the Second Circuit has found the following:
That standard, in turn, involves at least four separate inquiries. Under the cases from
International Shoe to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the court must ex-
amine the extent to which defendants availed themselves of the privileges of Ameri-
can law, the extent to which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to
them, the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the United States, and the
countervailing interests of the United States in hearing the suit.
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
174. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428.
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976) specifically prohibited prejudgment attachment of the
property of a foreign sovereign unless the foreign state has explicitly waived the immunity
from attachment and the attachment is to secure the satisfaction of the judgment. See Kane,
Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 n. 118 (1982).
176. A tort occurring within the United States would fall under the already existing excep-
tion to immunity at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976), which provides that a foreign sovereign will
not be immune in any suit "in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for the
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state. . . ." Id
177. It is also possible that a tort would occur outside the United States but still arise out of
activities in the United States, in which case specific jurisdiction would be appropriate. In
contrast, general jurisdiction implies contacts with the forum sufficient to justify an assertion
of personal jurisdiction regardless of whether the cause of action arose from activities within
the forum, or completely independent from the forum. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 US. 437, 446-48 (1952) (business contacts which were "continuous and sys-
tematic" were adequate to justify general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984) (foreign corporation with no
permanent business operations and limited business transactions in the forum did not have
contacts sufficient to justify general jurisdiction); id at 414 n.9 (definition of "general
jurisdiction").
178. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (definition of "specific jurisdiction").
179. See id. at 414-16.
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an assertion of general jurisdiction. The Second Circuit in Amerada Hess
concluded that Argentina's contacts with the United States were suffi-
cient for personal jurisdiction. 18° Although the issue of general and spe-
cific jurisdiction was not discussed by the court, since the cause of action
arose outside of the United States the court must have found contacts
sufficient to assert general jurisdiction.
181
In summary, the procedural and substantive hurdles of proving a
violation of international law, the act of state doctrine, forum non con-
veniens and personal jurisdiction would provide stringent limitations on
the suits that could be heard under the proposed amendment to the
FSIA. With certain exceptions, the type of suit for which the proposed
amendment would deny immunity to a foreign sovereign is that in which
there is (1) an alleged act clearly in violation of a universally accepted
international norm, which was (2) perpetrated by a sovereign with mini-
mum contacts with the United States, such act (3) occurring outside of
the territory of the defendant sovereign, with (4) no alternative forum in
which the plaintiff can pursue his claim to a just result. The type of suit
involved in Amerada Hess meets all these requirements, but only a lim-
ited number of other cases would. Cases meeting these requirements
would probably involve issues of human rights, environmental protec-
tion, and international stability.
C. Comity
Comity is the recognition and respect for sovereignty given by one
nation to another. It is a code of conduct which is "neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other."' 182 Nations observe comity for reasons of duty and con-
venience, and to protect the rights of their own citizens.' 8 3 The doctrine
of sovereign immunity itself is based on comity. 184 A possible objection
to a FSIA waiver of sovereign immunity based on violations of interna-
180. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 428 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
181. Id. The Court simply stated: "In this case, we find that the constitutional require-
ments for jurisdiction are satisfied." Id.
182. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See generally Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 33, at 82-87 (general discussion of comity concerning human rights violations in the
international arena); Comment, supra note 149, at 243-49 (brief discussion of general princi-
ples of comity).
183. In Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164, the Supreme Court stated that comity is the "recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."
184. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) ("[F]oreign sover-
eign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a
restriction imposed by the Constitution.").
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tional law would be that it might upset foreign relations of the United
States based on these notions of comity.
In deciding whether the concern for preserving comity should pre-
vail, the courts of the United States are often advised by the executive
branch of the possible effects a decision might have on foreign relations.
The executive branch has increasingly indicated that enforcement of in-
ternational law is in the best interest of foreign policy. 185 With regard to
the act of state doctrine, the executive branch, through the State Depart-
ment, has filed several letters urging against the application of comity
and asking courts to rule on the acts of foreign sovereigns. 186 In Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, the Departments of Justice and State fied an amicus curiae
brief urging the court to hear the case. This brief pointed out that since
there was a clear violation of international law, "a refusal to recognize a
private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage
the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human
rights."
1 8 7
The proliferation of international conventions and treaties concern-
ing individuals' rights also reflects the changing role of comity in interna-
tional law. 88 In many cases, extending immunity to a foreign nation
based on notions of comity would indicate a weakening of American
commitment to international law and thereby harm relations with na-
tions opposed to the sort of violation perpetrated by the defendant.
To address these competing concerns, one commentator has sug-
gested a balancing test: "The possibility of embarrassing and undercut-
ting the executive branch should be weighed against the need to dissuade
perpetrators of international wrongs."18 9 At one extreme would be cases
in which the international norm violated has clear universal acceptance
and the foreign policy implications of denying immunity are weak; at the
other extreme would be cases involving less certain rules of international
law with serious implications for refusal to extend comity. In all cases in
which comity is an issue, "[tihe best way to accomplish the maximization
of suits against international aggressors and minimize foreign policy in-
terference is simply to continue the existing practice of inviting the De-
partment of State to comment on actions against foreign officials [and
foreign sovereigns]."' 190 The decision whether or not to assert jurisdic-
185. See Comment, supra note 149, at 245-46.
186. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
187. Amicus curiae Brief by the United States Departments of Justice and State, at 22-23,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
188. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 33, at 66-67 n.65 (listing of 12 treaties and conven-
tions concerning human rights of the individual to which the United States is a party (has
signed and ratified), and nine treaties and conventions to which the United States is a signa-
tory, but not yet a party).
189. Comment, supra note 149, at 247.
190. Id at 248.
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tion over a foreign sovereign would remain completely within the prov-
ince of the courts, with the comments of the State Department being just
one of the sources of information upon which the decision is based.
With regard to the proposed amendment to the FSIA, comity be-
tween nations could be interpreted to require one of two different results.
First, notions of comity could be interpreted to deny American courts
the power to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. Second, notions
of comity could be interpreted to demand jurisdiction and deny immu-
nity to punish obvious violations of accepted international laws. The best
aid in assessing the implications of a grant or denial of sovereign immu-
nity under the principles of comity would be advisory comments to the
courts from the State Department.
D. Political Question Doctrine
Another possible objection to asserting jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign for international law violations could be based on the political
question doctrine. This doctrine prevents courts from ruling on politi-
cally sensitive issues that are properly within the ambit of coordinate
branches of government.191 Suits involving foreign sovereigns, and there-
fore foreign relations, are always subject to political question analysis.
The danger arises from automatic application of the doctrine to preclude
courts from hearing cases involving foreign sovereigns as plaintiffs. 19
2
The ATCA reflects the congressional intention that the judiciary
hear suits involving matters of international law. The exceptions to im-
munity enumerated in the FSIA, however, demonstrate that Congress
also intended the judiciary to hear suits involving foreign sovereigns in
certain limited situations. Moreover, courts are not precluded from
hearing a case simply because it affects foreign relations. 193 Ultimately,
the political question doctrine is a doctrine of judicial self-restraint; it is
not codified, and its sole basis is the separation of power principles un-
derlying the Constitution. As Judge Bork observed in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
191. The doctrine has never had a rigid formulation. The Supreme Court gave general
characteristics of a "political question issue" in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate polit-
ical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
policy decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
192. See Comment, supra note 135, at 236-38.
193. The Supreme Court made this clear in Baker: "Yet it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 369 U.S.
at 211.
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Arab Republic, "the contours of the doctrine are murky and unset-
tled." 194 The doctrine must be considered by courts in suits involving
foreign sovereigns, but it should not automatically preclude any case
which implicates foreign relations.
In examining whether an issue is a political question, a court should
focus on the three inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of
questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand
that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (ii) Do prudential
considerations counsel against judicial intervention?" 195 Justice Powell
has also suggested that the doctrine involves "prudential concerns calling
for mutual respect among the three branches of government." 196 To ad-
dress these "prudential concerns" when analyzing the propriety of grant-
ing sovereign immunity, courts are free to turn to the State Department
for information regarding the views and knowledge of the executive
branch. Adjudicating claims is within the scope and expertise of the ju-
dicial branch. The political question doctrine, therefore, would only pre-
vent exercise of jurisdiction in cases where "prudential considerations
counsel against judicial intervention."
Neither comity between nations nor the political question doctrine
prevents courts from asserting jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns for vi-
olations of international law. Both doctrines should be considered by the
courts in cases involving foreign sovereigns, and therefore foreign rela-
tions. The views of the executive branch are crucial to a prudent deci-
sion, and these views are readily available through the State Department.
The two doctrines do not preclude an amendment to the FSIA denying
immunity to foreign sovereigns for violations of international law; they
merely call for careful analysis of their proper effect on each individual
case.
Conclusion
In Amerada Hess, the district court was correct in its analysis and
dismissal of the case. The court relied on the clear language of the FSIA
to find Argentina immune from suit, despite the apparent grant of juris-
diction by the ATCA. Although the Second Circuit improperly inter-
preted the current FSIA when reversing the district court's dismissal, its
motives were understandable, and even commendable. A case like Amer-
ada Hess, alleging a clear act of aggression in violation of international
law, should be heard by the courts of the United States; but the clear
mandate of the FSIA precludes such a hearing. The federal courts can-
194. 726 F.2d 774, 803 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
195. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
196. Id at 1000.
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not ignore an affirmative decision by Congress to deny immunity. The
ATCA, a "newly revived" statute with an unclear role in the overall stat-
utory scheme, cannot be used to circumvent the FSIA.
The most viable way to allow suits alleging violations of interna-
tional law to be heard by federal district courts, and thus carry out the
spirit of the Second Circuit's decision, is to create a new exception to
immunity in the FSIA. If properly done, the possible harm from a flood
of litigation could be minimized by procedural barriers which plaintiffs
would have to cross before their suits could properly be heard. The effect
on foreign relations would, for the most part, be positive, since the
United States would be demonstrating its commitment to international
order and stability and to the development of an international legal order
in areas of emerging importance.
